/ 


Our  Relations  with  Japan 


By 

Henry  W.  Taft 


Issued  by  the 

JAPAN  SOCIETY 

25  West  43d  Street 
New  York  City 


[Reprint  in  substance  of  articles  published  in  the  New  York  Times  o 
June  26,  28  and  29,  1920.] 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 
Columbia  University  Libraries 


https://archive.org/details/ourrelationswithOOtaft 


OUR  RELATIONS  WITH  JAPAN 

Observations  Occasioned  by  a Recent  Visit  to  Japan. 


THE  Vanderlip  party  which  recently  visited  Japan 
was  organized  by  Mr.  Frank  A.  Vanderlip  on  the 
invitation  of  the  so-called  Welcome  Association, 
composed  of  a group  of  gentlemen  prominent  in  the 
public  and  business  affairs  of  Japan.  One  of  the  chief 
objects  of  that  Association  is,  by  affording  opportunities 
for  the  acquisition  of  exact  information  and  by  friendly 
exchange  of  views,  to  promote  cordial  relations  between 
Japan  and  America.  The  leading  spirit  in  the  Welcome 
Association  is  Baron  Shibusawa,  who  is  well  known  in 
this  country.  Although  now  84  years  of  age  and  retired 
from  business,  he  continues  very  actively  engaged  in 
promulgating  liberal  ideas,  and  is  indefatigable  in  all 
kinds  of  good  works  designed  to  improve  the  welfare  of 
the  Japanese  people.  He  and  the  large  element  of  the 
people  that  he  represents  are  strong  advocates  of  peace 
among  the  nations  of  the  earth.  Recent  criticism  in 
America  of  Japan’s  national  policy  led  the  Welcome  Asso- 
ciation to  invite  Mr.  Vanderlip  to  select  a group  of  repre- 
sentative Americans  to  go  to  Japan  and  look  into  the 
facts.  The  Vanderlip  party  was,  of  course,  unofficial.  It 
came  in  close  contact,  however,  not  only  with  the  Ameri- 
can Embassy  in  Japan,  but  also  with  leading  members  of 
the  Japanese  Government.  If  it  had  had  official  functions 
it  could  not  have  received  greater  hospitality  than  it  did 
from  the  social,  business  and  official  world  of  Japan,  and 
it  was  afforded  the  most  unusual  opportunities  to  obtain 
information  concerning  all  questions  which  are  of  mutual 
interest  to  Japan  and  America. 

During  our  visit  in  Tokyo  a conference  was  held 
every  morning  for  six  days,  at  which  subjects  of  inter- 
national interest  were  discussed.  These  conferences  were 


3 


attended  by  all  of  the  members  of  our  party.  Baron 
Shibusawa  and  Mr.  Vanderlip  were  the  joint  chairmen. 
Viscount  Kaneko  usually  presided,  as  he  understood  both 
the  Japanese  and  the  English  languages.  Besides  these, 
Baron  Megata,  Baron  Sakatani,  Mr.  Fujiyama,  President 
of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Tokyo,  Dr.  Soyeda,  Mr. 
Sumoto  and  a number  of  other  men  prominent  in  public 
and  business  affairs  in  Japan,  some  being  connected  with 
the  government,  were  present.  After  our  visit  to  Tokyo, 
we  visited  Yokohama,  Kyoto,  Osaka,  Kobe,  Nara  and 
Nikko,  and  at  these  places,  as  well  as  at  Tokyo,  members 
of  our  party  came  in  contact  with  the  leading  Japanese 
citizens  and  freely  discussed  with  them  Japanese  affairs. 
These  included  Prime  Minister  Hara,  Viscount  Uchida, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Prince  Yamagata,  Count 
Okuma,  Baron  Goto,  Baron  Mitsui,  and  many  others  who 
are  now  influencing  public  sentiment  in  Japan. 

We  were  all  impressed  with  the  desire  of  Japanese 
statesmen  to  make  an  effort  to  conciliate  American  public 
opinion.  They  gave  us  detailed  information,  and  we 
found  the  leading  members  of  the  government  remark- 
ably candid  in  explaining  what  had  taken  place  in  the 
Orient  during  the  great  war,  and  in  stating  what  was  to 
be  the  future  international  policy  of  Japan. 

With  a short  acquaintance  with  the  Oriental  situation, 
it  would  not  be  wise  to  be  too  dogmatic  in  proposing  a 
solution  of  the  complex  problems  with  which  Asiatic 
nations  are  wrestling.  Observers  of  Oriental  politics  are 
too  prone  to  become  either  pro-Chinese  or  pro-Japanese, 
with  the  result  that  unconsciously,  perhaps,  they  distort 
the  facts  and  arrive  at  conclusions  which  are  in  accord- 
ance with  their  predilections.  While  the  extraordinary 
hospitality  extended  to  us  by  the  Japanese,  and  undoubt- 
edly inspired  by  sincere  feeling,  has  inclined  us  to  the 
most  friendly  feeling  not  only  for  the  leaders  whom  we 
met  in  different  parts  of  Japan,  but  also  for  the  Japanese 
people,  who  gave  many  evidences  of  friendship  for 
America,  personally  I do  not  feel  that  that  circumstance 


4 


ought  to  interfere  with  our  arriving  at  a discriminating 
judgment  upon  some  of  the  underlying  conditions  which 
affect  our  two  nations. 


The  Friendly  Attitude  of  the  Japanese  People  and 
Their  Leading  Statesmen. 

Our  discussions  with  leaders  of  thought  in  Japan  were 
marked  by  the  greatest  candor  on  both  sides.  Many  of 
these  leaders  did  not  hesitate  to  admit  that  Japan  had 
made  mistakes,  particularly  when  they  were  speaking  of 
acts  for  which  their  political  opponents  were  responsible, 
for  internal  politics  plays  a large  part  in  Japan  even  in 
matters  affecting  international  relations.  But  it  was  gen- 
erally added  that  mistakes  were  to  be  expected  in  the 
conduct  of  the  affairs  of  a nation  which  had  been  de- 
veloping its  modern  civilization  for  only  three-quarters 
of  a century.  Upon  many  matters,  however,  the  Japanese 
with  some  insistence  claim  that  the  rest  of  the  world 
has  been  misled  through  an  inadequate  understanding  of 
the  facts  and  of  the  Oriental  environment.  They  are 
tolerant  of  differences  of  opinion  concerning  their  nation- 
al policy,  and  are  more  than  willing  to  disclose  what  they 
claim  to  be  the  facts;  but  they  are  extremely  sensitive 
when  action  by  other  nations,  and  particularly  by 
America,  is  predicated  upon  a supposed  inferiority  of  their 
race;  and  when  one  has  seen  the  remarkable  development 
in  the  economic  and  industrial  life  of  Japan,  the  solidarity 
with  which  the  Japanese  people  pursue  their  national 
aspirations,  the  effective  manner  in  which  they  are  culti- 
vating the  modern  arts  of  civilization,  and  the  importance 
which  they  attach  to  universal  education  of  the  people, 
one  is  not  surprised  that  the  people  of  Japan  expect  to 
be  ranked  as  among  the  nations  of  the  earth  who  have 
reached  the  highest  point  of  civilization,  precisely  as  they 
are  now  recognized  as  one  of  the  powers  of  the  world. 


5 


Immigration  and  the  California  Land  Question. 

It  is  the  reaction  which  has  followed  the  assumption 
by  America  of  racial  superiority  that  has  caused  more 
irritation  than  many  of  the  other  questions,  more  im- 
portant to  us,  which  have  been  the  subject  of  international 
discussion.  The  Japanese  have  felt  that  they  have  not 
only  been  treated  as  inferior  to  Americans,  but  also  to 
other  people  less  advanced  than  they,  who  are  permitted 
to  enter  the  United  States  under  restrictions  milder  than 
those  imposed  on  them.  There  seems  to  be  no  expecta- 
tion (or  any  very  strong  desire)  on  the  part  of  Japan  that 
we  should  change  our  Oriental  exclusion  policy.  But  we 
found  a considerable  amount  of  irritation  on  account  of 
the  manner  in  which  California  has  been  recently  dealing 
with  the  land  question,  in  its  effort  to  prevent  Japanese 
residents  of  that  state  from  acquiring  agricultural  lands. 
This  question  should  not  be  confused  with  the  general  im- 
migration exclusion  policy  of  the  United  States,  which  is 
embodied  in  the  “Gentlemen’s  Agreement,”  negotiated  by 
Mr.  Root,  and  which  is  being  faithfully  observed  by  Japan, 
nor  does  the  complaint  of  the  importation  of  “Picture 
Brides,”  who  are  soon  to  be  entirely  excluded,  cut  much 
figure.  The  Japanese  are  not  a colonizing  people — their 
love  of  their  native  land  is  too  intense  for  that.  Japan’s 
statesmen  seem  to  be  willing  at  present  to  keep  as  many 
of  her  nationals  as  they  can  in  the  Archipelago  or  in 
Formosa  or  Korea,  or  if  they  must  be  colonized,  to  send 
them,  as  they  are  now  doing,  to  those  other  parts  of  Asia 
which  are  near  at  hand  and  are  being  developed  with 
Japanese  capital. 

But  in  California  an  effort  is  being  made  to  prevent 
Japanese  who  are  permanent  residents,  although  not 
citizens,  from  acquiring  control,  through  leases  or  by 
transfer  to  their  minor  children,  of  agricultural  lands. 
The  proposed  legislation  based  on  initiative  petitions  now 
in  circulation,  and  the  political  agitation  which  it  has 
aroused,  have  been  marked  by  exaggerated  and  inflamed 


statements  concerning  Japan  and  the  Japanese.  I do  not 
mean  to  enter  upon  a discussion  of  the  merits  of  the  land 
question  in  California.  It  would  not  be  wise  for  one  to 
attempt  this  who  is  not  a resident  of  that  state  and  has 
not  studied  on  the  ground  the  facts.  But  it  would  seem 
clear  that  under  the  present  arrangement  with  Japan 
there  is  no  danger  of  a Japanese  inundation,  which,  for 
one,  I am  clear  should  be  effectively  guarded  against. 

In  the  first  decade  of  this  century,  8,785,000  immi- 
grants arrived  in  the  United  States  from  all  countries. 
Only  62,432  of  these  were  Japanese,  that  is,  about  three- 
fourths  of  one  per  cent,  of  the  whole.  There  are  now 
about  100,000  Japanese  in  this  country.  Further  immi- 
gration under  the  “Gentlemen’s  Agreement”  is  not  a 
menace,  for  in  the  six  years  between  1908  and  1913,  in- 
clusive, when  it  was  in  effect,  there  were  more  departures 
of  Japanese  than  arrivals. 

Nor  does  the  California  land  situation  seem  so  desper- 
ate as  to  justify  a disturbance  of  international  relations. 
The  Japanese  now  own  28,000  acres  of  farm  land  in 
California  and  cultivate  under  lease  or  contract,  perhaps 

250.000  acres  more.  However  their  competition  may 
affect  California  farmers  with  whom  they  come  in  con- 
tact, certainly  the  presence  in  California  of  perhaps 

40.000  Japanese,  who  have  reclaimed  much  of  the  poorest 
land  in  the  state  and  economically  have  been  of  great 
benefit  to  its  commercial  interests,  is  not  a peril  to  the 

2.615.000  Americans  residing  in  a state  having  29,000,000 
acres  of  arable  land. 

The  complaint  in  California  is  not  that  the  Japanese 
are  lacking  in  efficiency  or  character,  but  rather  that  they 
are  so  industrious,  so  frugal,  and  so  prosperous  that 
American  farmers  are  not  able  successfully  to  compete 
with  them.  In  certain  of  the  agricultural  districts,  and 
particularly  in  the  Sacramento  Valley,  it  is  said  that  they 
are  seeking  to  obtain  a monopoly  in  desirable  land,  which 
they  cultivate  intensively,  and  that,  under  the  advice  of 
American  lawyers,  in  order  to  defeat  the  legislative  policy 


7 


of  the  state,  they  have  purchased  lands  in  the  name  of 
their  minor  children.  They  have  probably  been  badly 
advised  in  pressing  their  legal  rights  against  the  current 
of  public  opinion,  and  as  a result  discriminatory  legisla- 
tion is  now  threatened.  One  of  the  proposed  bills  denies 
the  right  of  any  citizen  to  lease  land  for  any  purpose 
whatsoever  to  a Japanese  under  the  penalty  of  confisca- 
tion. Another,  in  order  to  defeat  the  purposes  of  Japanese 
parents  in  putting  land  in  the  name  of  their  children, 
proposes  to  remove  Japanese  children  from  the  guardian- 
ship of  their  parents  and  force  them  under  the  guardian- 
ship of  the  public  administrator. 

The  title  to  land,  or  any  other  matter  of  local  admin- 
istration or  domestic  interest,  is,  of  course,  primarily  a 
matter  for  regulation  by  the  state  legislature  or  by  the 
people  themselves.  Many  states  of  the  Union  and  many 
nations,  including,  I believe,  Japan,  discriminate  in 
matters  of  land  titles  against  aliens,  and  this  has  always 
been  regarded  as  sound  public  policy.  But  the  complaint 
of  Japan  is  that  a single  state  of  the  United  States,  with 
much  acerbity  aroused  by  political  discussion,  is  discrimi- 
nating against  the  nationals  of  Japan  alone,  and  that  they 
are  doing  it  where,  legally  speaking,  the  discrimination 
affects  the  rights  of  minor  children  who  are  by  birth 
Americans  and  who,  upon  becoming  of  age,  will  be  en- 
titled under  our  Constitution  to  the  free  and  untram- 
meled enjoyment  of  their  rights  of  property.  Some  of  the 
acts  proposed  to  be  submitted  to  a referendum  have  been 
couched  in  language  implying  with  unnecessary  vigor  the 
inferiority  of  the  Japanese  race.  These  have  been  re- 
sented by  leaders  of  liberal  Japanese  thought,  who  are, 
however,  entirely  sympathetic  with  an  orderly  effort  to 
settle  the  Japanese  land  question  in  a way  satisfactory  to 
California. 


8 


The  Local  Situation  in  California  Should  Not  Be  Per- 
mitted to  Disturb  Our  Friendly  Relations  With  Japan. 

An  International  Commission  Suggested. 

Whatever  the  merits  of  the  California  land  question, 
and  however  the  Japanese  residents  of  that  state  deserve 
the  drastic  legislation  proposed  by  the  referendum,  the 
fact  remains  that  a situation  affecting  a comparatively 
small  number  of  California  citizens  is  affecting,  and 
threatening  still  more  to  affect,  the  friendly  relations 
between  two  great  nations.  While  the  interests  of  the 
people  of  California  must,  of  course,  be  sedulously  pro- 
tected, something  also  is  due  to  the  country  at  large  so 
that  an  issue  fraught  with  danger  to  our  international 
relations  may  not  be  unduly  pressed.  What  is  needed  is 
a fair  hearing  of  both  sides  of  the  controversy  before 
some  tribunal  authorized  to  investigate  the  facts  as  a 
basis  for  treaty  provisions  finally  disposing  of  the  matter. 
I have  found  considerable  support  (even  in  California) 
for  the  idea  that  such  a tribunal  should  be  a joint  high 
international  commission.  The  findings  of  such  a com- 
mission, based  on  a thorough  investigation,  both  in  this 
country  and  in  Japan,  of  all  the  facts,  would  have  much 
weight.  It  might  also  become  a suitable  agency  for 
settling  other  troublesome  questions,  such,  for  instance, 
as  that  relating  to  language  schools  in  Hawaii,  Oriental 
immigration  generally,  and  any  other  matters  which  can- 
not be  conveniently  settled  through  the  ordinary  diplo- 
matic processes. 

I hope  that  the  idea  of  an  international  commission 
will  receive  the  public  discussion  it  deserves.  While 
ordinarily  international  questions  ought  to  be  arranged 
through  diplomatic  negotiations,  it  would  be  difficult  for 
diplomatic  representatives  to  make  an  investigation  of 
the  complex  facts  of  the  California  situation;  nor  would 
their  conclusions  carry  the  weight  in  that  state  which 
would  attach  to  a report  of  a commission  authorized  to 


9 


investigate  every  phase  of  the  subject  in  both  countries; 
and  only  through  such  a commission  could  the  investiga- 
tion he  freed  from  the  inflammatory  effect  of  local  politi- 
cal exigencies. 


The  So-called  Oriental  Mind. 

It  has  been  a common  assumption  in  this  country 
that  the  Oriental  mind  is  mysterious  and  inscrutable. 
Most  of  us  who  have  dealt  with  Oriental  questions  spas- 
modically and  indolently,  have  found  this  assumption 
convenient  in  explaining  international  episodes  which  we 
have  had  neither  the  inclination  nor  the  facilities  for 
thoroughly  investigating.  A closer  acquaintance  with 
Oriental  people,  however,  has  led  me  to  the  conclusion 
that  their  mental  processes  are  not  essentially  different 
from  ours.  It  is  true,  of  course,  that  their  viewpoint  is 
affected  by  national  customs,  religion,  historical  tradi- 
tions, inadequate  knowledge  of  conditions  existing  in  dis- 
tant parts  of  the  earth,  and,  more  than  all  of  these,  by  the 
difference  in  the  language,  for  the  difficulty  in  conveying 
ideas  is  fraught  with  much  greater  danger  of  misunder- 
standing than  is  incident  to  intercourse  with  nations 
whose  language,  being  more  nearly  allied  to  ours,  can  be 
much  more  readily  acquired  than  the  bewildering  Chinese 
ideographs,  and  the  complicated  Japanese  language  which 
is  largely  based  upon  them.  x\ssuming  that  the  Oriental 
way  of  looking  at  things  is  due  to  these  conditions,  it 
makes  it  desirable,  if  we  would  avoid  international  mis- 
understandings, that  we  should  make  a special  effort  to 
overcome  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  complete  mutual 
understanding;  and  the  California  situation  makes  it  par- 
ticularly desirable  that  such  an  effort  should  be  made, 
especially  as  it  is  difficult  for  the  Japanese  to  understand 
how  the  local  interests  of  a limited  class  in  a single  state 
of  the  United  States  can  be  permitted  to  threaten  the 
friendly  relations  between  the  two  nations. 


10 


The  Shantung  Question. 

The  Shantung  province  has  a population  of  about 
thirty  millions  and  is  sanctified  to  the  Chinese  people 
because  it  contains  the  grave  of  Confucius.  It  contains 
on  the  seacoast  the  district  of  Kiao  Chau  which  comprises 
about  twenty  square  miles  and  before  the  war  had  been 
leased  to  Germany  for  a long  term.  Tsing  Tau,  the  city 
within  the  district,  was  made  an  attractive  and  flourish- 
ing modern  city  during  the  German  occupation. 

At  the  outset  our  Japanese  conferees  were  inclined 
to  urge  that  there  was  no  such  thing  as  a Shantung 
question,  and  that  there  could  be  no  controversy  except 
as  to  Kiao  Chau  and  Tsing  Tau.  Upon  our  explaining 
that  an  impression  was  widely  prevalent  in  this  country 
that  Japan  was  seeking  by  indirection  to  obtain  the 
sovereignty  of  the  entire  Shantung  province,  we  received 
ample  statements  concerning  the  facts  and  the  future 
policy  of  Japan. 

Japan’s  Policy  in  Shantung  Since  1914. 

It  would  have  historical  interest,  if  space  permitted, 
to  review  the  facts  relating  to  Japan’s  military  campaign 
for  the  reduction  of  Kiao  Chau  and  her  subsequent  treaty 
arrangements  with  China  concerning  her  future  relations 
to  that  district  and  the  economic  concessions  in  the  Shan- 
tung province.  Such  a review  would  probably  afford 
evidence  that  elation  over  the  victory  over  the  German 
forces  and  belief  that  military  control  of  the  Shantung 
province  by  Japan  was  desirable,  had  led  powerful 
elements  in  Japan  to  dream  of  sovereignty  and  to 
manoeuvre  to  accomplish  that  end.  Extreme  demands, 
subsequently  modified,  could  be  pointed  to  which  show 
in  the  early  years  of  the  war  lack  of  constancy,  if  not 
of  sincerity,  in  dealing  with  the  situation.  But  it  is  to 
be  remembered  that  these  things  took  place  when  the 
attention  of  the  nations  of  the  world  was  focussed  not 


11 


upon  negotiations  (some  of  them  secret)  between  China 
and  Japan,  but  upon  the  efforts  of  Japan  to  co-operate 
with  the  Allies  in  defeating  Germany  and  destroying  her 
military  power  in  the  east.  Shifting  internal  Japanese 
politics  at  that  time  had  much  to  do  with  the  policy  of 
Japan  and  if  we  would  not  be  misled  we  should  give 
much  more  weight  to  the  more  recent  attitude  of  the 
Japanese  government  when  the  Shantung  question,  by 
reason  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  of  Peace,  became  the 
concern  of  the  great  powers  of  the  world.  For  the  practi- 
cal situation  is  that  Japan  has  obtained  the  insertion  in 
the  Peace  Treaty  of  the  Shantung  provisions,  but  only 
upon  her  assurance  that  she  would  not  seek  to  impair 
the  sovereignty  of  China  in  the  Shantung  province  and 
would,  as  speedily  as  possible,  enter  into  negotiations 
with  China  for  a settlement  of  the  Kiao  Chau  situation 
and  all  questions  growing  out  of  the  economic  concessions 
in  the  province  originally  granted  to  Germany.  In  this 
connection  the  statement  of  President  Wilson  to  the 
Senate  Committee  will  be  recalled. 


Japan’s  Assurances  That  Shantung  Was  to  be  Returned 
to  the  Sovereignty  of  China. 

He  said  that  his  understanding  with  the  Japanese 
delegates  in  Paris  was  “that  Japan  should  return  to  China 
in  full  sovereignty  the  old  province  of  Shantung  so  far  as 
Germany  had  any  claims  upon  it,  preserving  to  herself 
the  right  to  establish  a residential  district  at  Tsing  Tau 
which  is  the  town  of  Kiao  Chau  Bay;  that  with  regard  to 
the  railways  and  mines  she  should  retain  only  the  rights 
of  an  economic  concession  there  with  the  right,  however, 
to  maintain  a special  body  of  police  on  the  railway,  the 
personnel  of  which  should  be  Chinese  under  Japanese 
instructors  nominated  by  the  managers  of  the  company 
and  appointed  by  the  Chinese  government.  I think  that 
is  the  whole  of  it  * * *.  She  has  promised  not  to 


retain  any  sovereignty  at  all.”  Japan  did  not  fix  any 
time  for  the  return  of  Shantung  further  than  to  say  that 
it  should  be  as  soon  as  possible,  and  the  President  added 
that  “We  relied  on  Japan’s  good  faith  in  fulfilling  that 
promise.” 

In  August,  1919,  Viscount  Uchida,  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  Japan,  stated  to  the  press  that  Japan 
did  not  have  any  intention  to  retain  or  to  claim  any 
rights  which  affect  the  territorial  sovereignty  of  China  in 
the  province  of  Shantung. 

Prime  Minister  Hara  at  about  the  same  time  made 
a similar  statement  and  added  that  “for  the  restitution 
of  Kiao  Chau  detailed  arrangements  should  be  worked 
out  beforehand  in  common  accord  between  the  Japanese 
and  Chinese  governments  and  that  the  length  of  time  re- 
quired for  such  arrangements  depends  largely  upon  the 
attitude  of  China.  In  any  case,  we  fully  realize  that  it  is 
as  much  in  our  interest  as  in  the  interests  of  China  to 
accelerate  the  conclusion  of  all  needed  arrangements  and 
to  effect  without  unnecessary  delay  the  restitution  of 
leased  territory  which  we  have  solemnly  undertaken.” 

Finally,  in  an  official  statement  embodied  in  corre- 
spondence between  Japan  and  China,  the  Japanese  For- 
eign Office  on  June  14,  1920,  reiterated  its  “desire  and 
intention  to  effect  a restoration  of  Kiao  Chau  to  China 
and  to  settle  matters  incidental  thereto.”  This  statement 
contained  the  following  unambiguous  declaration: 

“Second — That  it  is  the  intention  of  the  Japan- 
ese Government  to  withdraw  its  troops  from  along 
the  Shantung  Railway  as  a matter  of  course  upon 
agreement  between  the  two  governments  regard- 
ing the  disposition  of  Kiao  Chau.  In  fact,  the 
Japanese  Government  wishes  to  withdraw  its 
troops  as  speedily  as  possible,  even  before  an 
agreement  is  entered  into,  but,  in  the  absence  of 
any  competent  force  to  assume  the  duty  of  guard- 
ing the  railway  after  evacuation,  it  is  constrained 


13 


to  keep  those  troops  temporarily  stationed  there 
to  insure  the  security  of  communications  and  safe- 
guard the  interests  of  Japan  and  China,  who  are 
co-partners  in  a joint  enterprise.” 

It  was  added  “Repeated  declarations  of  the  Imperial 
Japanese  Government  leave  no  room  for  doubt  as  to  the 
singleness  of  purpose  with  which  Japan  seeks  at  the 
earliest  date  a fair  and  just  settlement  of  the  question.” 


Attempts  by  Japan  to  Negotiate  Witb  China. 

Japan  has  repeatedly  attempted  to  take  up  with 
China  the  adjustment  which  is  obviously  necessary;  and 
apparently  the  delay  in  making  a final  settlement  is  due 
to  the  ditficulty  in  procuring  China,  which  so  far  as  a 
national  government  is  concerned  is  practically  acephal- 
ous, to  function  at  all  in  relation  to  foreign  affairs.  The 
fact  seems  to  be  that  the  Chinese  delegates  went  to  Paris 
to  procure  from  the  Peace  Commission  an  arrangement 
for  the  return  to  China  of  both  the  Shantung  province 
and  the  Kiao  Chau  district,  not  only  without  any  im- 
pairment of  its  sovereignty  rights,  but  also  freed  from 
all  engagements  previously  made  with  either  Germany 
or  Japan  concerning  economic  rights  and  concessions. 
Whatever  mistakes  Japan  may  have  made  with  refer- 
ence to  the  Shantung  question,  and  however  grasping  it 
may  be  said  that  she  has  been  in  extorting  from  China 
unfavorable  treaties,  China  can  hardly  justify  herself  to 
the  world,  now  that  the  light  of  publicity  is  thrown  upon 
the  whole  situation,  in  refusing  at  least  to  enter  upon  a 
negotiation  for  an  adjustment  of  this  troublesome 
question. 

The  Situation  Created  by  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 

The  repeated  assertion  by  Japan  that,  under  Articles 
156,  157  and  158  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  of  Peace,  they 
do  not  claim  to  have  acquired  any  political  rights  in  any 


14 


part  of  the  province,  except  in  a limited  way  in  Kiao 
Chau,  does  not  entirely  allay  unfriendly  suspicion  among 
many  people  in  this  country.  By  the  Treaty  the  political 
and  economic  rights  and  powers  formerly  possessed  by 
Germany,  to  which,  under  the  Treaty,  Japan  succeeds, 
include  an  interest  in  the  railroad  running  from  Tsing 
Tau,  the  seaport,  to  Tsinan-Fu,  the  capital  of  the  province, 
a distance  of  about  170  miles,  and  this  involves  the  super- 
vision, even  where  there  are  only  economic  rights,  which 
pro-Chinese  critics  assert  will  by  gradual  encroachment 
ultimately  be  converted  into  political  control.  At  present, 
actual  control  is  exercised  through  the  maintenance  of  a 
Japanese  military  force,  not  only  in  Kiao  Chau,  but  also 
along  the  entire  line  of  the  railroad.  How  far  the  main- 
tenance of  order  makes  this  military  control  necessary  it 
would  probably  be  difficult  to  ascertain.  The  Japanese 
continue  to  assert,  however,  through  responsible  states- 
men, as  well  as  through  such  representative  citizens  as  we 
talked  with,  that  Japan  proposes  to  withdraw  her  troops 
as  soon  as  that  can  be  done  with  safety.  Japan  has  al- 
ready offered  to  China  to  make  the  railroad  a joint  enter- 
prise, in  the  benefit  and  management  of  which  the  two 
nations  should  equally  participate,  but  this,  and  indeed 
all  of  Japan’s  suggestions  concerning  a settlement  of  the 
Shantung  controversy  for  months  remained  unanswered. 
It  is  said  that  the  tenure  of  office  of  the  present  Chinese 
Government  is  so  precarious  and  its  personnel  is  so  weak 
(to  say  nothing  of  the  fact  that  it  exercises  hardly  more 
than  a nominal  control  of  the  great  Southern  provinces), 
that  it  does  not  dare  to  make  response  lest  it  should  give 
cause  for  its  ejection  from  office  or  a revolt  against  its 
authority.  The  government  did  announce  with  some  ir- 
relevance that  it  was  unable  to  enter  negotiations  for  the 
return  of  Shantung  because  China  had  not  herself  been 
a signatory  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  But  the  real  reason  for 
China’s  delay  appears  to  be  that  there  is  no  governmental 
authority  in  China  sufficiently  confident  of  its  own  posi- 
tion to  trust  itself  even  to  enter  into  negotiation.  Japan’s 


15 


last  note  expressed  again  a willingness  to  arrange  the 
details  of  a settlement  at  any  time  that  China  might  be 
ready,  and  the  significant  request  was  repeated  that 
China  expedite  the  organization  of  a police  force  for 
the  Shantung  railroad  so  as  to  permit  Japan  to  withdraw 
its  troops.  In  the  official  statement  of  the  Japanese  For- 
eign Office,  already  referred  to,  it  is  stated  that  the 
Chinese  Government  delayed  for  three  months  to  make  a 
reply  to  the  request  of  Japan  that  negotiations  be  entered 
into,  and  finally  made  the  reply,  which  was  little  more 
than  a request  for  delay,  with  the  statement  that  “the 
people  throughout  China  have  assumed  an  indignantly 
antagonistic  attitude  toward  the  question.  For  these 
reasons,  and  also  in  consideration  of  the  amity  existing 
between  Japan  and  China,  the  Chinese  Government  does 
not  find  itself  in  a position  to  reply  at  this  moment.”  It 
is  very  difficult  from  this  language  to  know  what  China 
intends  to  do,  although  a reference  is  made  in  her  re- 
sponse to  the  fact  that  she  is  proposing  “to  effect  a proper 
organization  to  replace  Japanese  troops  in  order  to  secure 
and  maintain  the  safety  of  the  whole  line.”  In  the  official 
statement  the  Japanese  Foreign  Department  refers  to  “a 
fundamental  agreement  * * * between  China  and 

Japan  as  to  the  disposition  of  the  leased  territory  of  Kiao 
Chau,”  probably  referring  to  the  treaties  between  China 
and  Japan  of  1915  and  1918,  the  obligation  of  which 
China  seems  to  be  ignoring. 

The  Japanese  Government  has  made  its  negotiations 
with  China  public  for  the  purpose  of  laying  its  case  be- 
fore the  world.  Certainly  something  more  is  needed 
from  China  before  it  can  be  justly  said  that  it  has  made 
out  its  case  against  Japan  with  reference  to  Shantung. 
Indeed,  it  yet  remains  for  her  to  state  to  the  world  what 
she  does  seek  to  accomplish  in  Shantung  and  Kiao  Chau. 
Her  present  position  is  by  no  means  clear. 


16 


Japan  Will  Probably  Make  Good  Her  Promises 
Concerning  Shantung. 

However  true  it  may  be  that  Japan  in  1914,  for  the 
purpose  of  reducing  Kiao  Chau,  marched  her  troops 
across  Shantung  peninsula,  against  the  formal  protest  of 
China,  never,  however,  very  seriously  pressed;  however 
sinister  may  have  been  the  implications  from  the  twenty- 
one  demands  made  by  Japan  on  China  in  1915;  to  what- 
ever extent  some  of  the  Japanese  governments  which 
have  been  in  office  since  1914  have  yielded  to  the  demands 
of  the  military  party  that  a Japanese  hegemony  over  the 
Shantung  peninsula  be  established;  whatever  truth  there 
may  be  in  China’s  claim  that  the  treaties  concerning 
Shantung  between  China  and  Japan  in  1915  and  1918 
were  the  result  of  coercion  exercised  by  Japan;  and  how- 
ever inconsistent  may  have  been  the  statements  made  by 
Japan  and  her  statesmen  in  1914  as  to  the  ultimate  dis- 
position of  what  was  acquired  in  Shantung  as  a result  of 
the  military  campaign — whatever,  I say,  may  be  the  real 
truth  with  reference  to  all  of  these  matters,  it  seems  fairly 
certain  now  that  the  view’s  of  the  liberal  element  in  Japan, 
influenced  no  doubt  by  the  public  opinion  of  the  world 
and  aroused  by  the  discussion  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  will 
prevail  in  its  insistence  that  the  sovereignty  of  China  out- 
side of  the  Kiao  Chau  district  shall  not  be  impaired,  and 
that  even  within  that  district  the  arrangement  for  Jhe 
protection  of  Japanese  interests  shall  not  be  extended  be- 
yond the  terms  of  some  arrangement  with  China,  recog- 
nized by  the  world  as  reasonable  under  the  circumstances. 

During  Mr.  Lansing’s  term  of  office  as  Secretary  of 
State  there  was  a tendency  to  return  to  a policy  with 
reference  to  Oriental  matters  substantially  similar  to  that 
of  Secretary  Knox  of  a decade  ago.  Thus,  the  consortium 
of  banking  groups  represented  by  Mr.  Lamont,  organized 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  financial  assistance  to  China, 
had  the  moral  backing  of  our  government.  Japan  was  a 


17 


participant  in  the  consortium.  Furthermore,  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement  recognized  the  fact  that  by  reason  of 
propinquity  and  of  political  interests,  Japan  had  a pecul- 
iar relation  to  Asiatic  matters.  Under  such  circum- 
stances it  is  hardly  probable  that  the  United  States  will 
object  to  Japan  seeking  economic  advantages  in  Asiatic 
countries.  The  propriety  of  her  seeking  such  advantages 
in  Shantung  is  expressly  recognized  by  the  Treaty  of 
Peace,  to  which  she  is  a party,  by  which,  although  against 
the  protest  of  China,  all  of  Germany’s  interests  in  Shan- 
tung, both  economic  and  political,  passed  to  Japan.  To 
this  arrangement,  as  I have  pointed  out,  President  Wilson 
also,  in  behalf  of  the  United  States,  gave  his  assent,  ob- 
taining from  the  Japanese  delegates  definite  assurances 
that  Japan  proposed  in  due  time  to  surrender  all  sover- 
eign rights  in  the  Shantung  peninsula.  Thus,  by  the 
formal  agreement  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  the  princi- 
pal European  nations  having  interests  in  Asia,  of  Ger- 
many herself,  and  of  all  the  other  signatories  to  the 
treaty,  and  by  the  action  of  the  United  States  government, 
a record  has  been  made  giving  Japan  a peculiarly  strong 
case  for  retaining  a substantial  economic  interest  in  the 
Shantung  province. 

While  the  military  party  in  Japan  may  conceivably 
regard  lightly  assurances  such  as  these,  and  may  insist 
that  where  national  existence  is  at  stake  they  must  be 
disregarded,  there  are  other  forces  at  work,  both  internal 
and  external,  which  will  probably  lead  Japan  to  make 
good  her  promises.  These  forces  are:  first,  the  gradual 
but  sure  increase  in  the  power  of  the  liberal  element  in 
Japanese  politics;  second,  the  reluctance  of  not  only  this 
element  but  also  of  the  military  party  itself,  to  do  any- 
thing which  will  offend  against  the  prevailing  sentiment 
of  the  world  powers  or  affect  the  friendly  relations  with 
other  nations  of  the  earth;  and,  third,  a hesitation  to  incur 
the  hostility  of  China  to  such  an  extent  as  to  interfere 
with  trade  relations  with  that  country.  The  eyes  of  the 
world  are  on  Japan  in  Shantung  and  she  can  ill  afford  to 

18 


obtain  advantages  at  the  cost  of  sacrificing  the  good 
opinion  of  the  western  powers;  and  that  she  may  suffer 
commercially  is  even  now  being  brought  forcibly  home  to 
her  by  the  boycott  of  Japanese  goods  now  seriously  af- 
fecting her  trade  with  Northern  China. 


Japan’s  Good  Faith. 

There  are,  of  course,  many  who  place  no  confidence 
in  Japan’s  good  faith,  who  assert  that  economic  conces- 
sions in  China  are  merely  the  precursors  of  political  en- 
croachments eating  into  the  sovereignty  of  that  country; 
and  they  point  to  Korea  and  to  the  tardiness  of  Japan 
in  withdrawing  her  military  forces  from  Siberia,  Man- 
churia, Mongolia  and  Shantung.  They  also  assert  that 
Japan  is  unduly  persistent  in  pressing  her  economic  ad- 
vantage wherever  she  has  concessions,  for  the  purpose 
of  excluding  the  trade  of  other  nations:  in  other  words, 
that  she  is  in  practice  nullifying  the  so-called  open-door 
policy  with  reference  to  Oriental  trade.  It  is  said  that 
in  Shantung  the  military  control  of  the  railroad  is  now 
being  used  to  discriminate  against  all  merchants  except 
the  Japanese  and  that  this  is  being  accomplished  by  such 
devices  as  railroad  rebates,  delays  in  shipments,  etc., 
which  were  familiar  in  our  railroad  transportation  a 
generation  ago.  But  if  Japan  confines  herself  to  trade 
competition  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  America  will 
attempt  to  correct  her  methods  at  the  risk  of  inter- 
national complications,  although  the  position  of  America 
as  one  of  the  Pacific  powers,  gives  her  a legitimate  in- 
terest in  events  that  may  affect  the  territorial  integrity 
or  the  political  independence  of  China,  and,  therefore,  we 
may  well  concern  ourselves  with  the  purposes  of  Japan 
in  Siberia,  Manchuria  and  Mongolia. 

If  the  President  had  accepted  the  League  of  Nations 
with  the  Lodge  reservations,  convenient  machinery  would 
have  been  provided  for  making  effective  the  protest  of 


19 


the  United  States  concerning  the  Shantung  provisions. 
But  those  provisions  have  now  gone  into  effect  by  the 
consent  of  the  other  great  powers.  In  the  absence  of  a 
ratification  of  the  Treaty  by  the  Senate,  the  protest  of 
that  body  amounts  to  nothing.  The  State  Department 
could,  of  course,  record  its  protest  and  exercise  its  moral 
influence  to  induce  Japan  to  surrender  the  advantages 
it  has  already  gained  under  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty. 
Whether  it  will  ever  do  so  is  at  least  problematical.  But 
in  spite  of  the  technical  strength  of  Japan’s  position, 
arising  from  these  facts,  it  does  not  appear,  as  I have 
pointed  out,  that  she  intends  to  insist  upon  her  legal 
rights. 


Japan’s  Occupation  of  Asiatic  Countries. 

In  Siberia,  and  to  a lesser  extent  in  Manchuria,  Shan- 
tung, and  Mongolia,  the  occupation  by  Japan  began  as  a 
move  in  the  military  situation.  At  first  this  was  a de- 
fensive measure  in  the  northern  countries,  made  neces- 
sary by  the  fear  that  Germany  mght  break  through 
Russia,  seize  China  and  then  attack  Japan.  Later  the 
Bolshevist  menace,  practical  anarchy  in  Siberia,  and  the 
weakness  or  the  absence  of  Chinese  governmental  au- 
thority in  the  Manchurian  and  Mongolian  provinces 
threw  upon  Japan  the  burden  of  maintaining  by  military 
force,  law  and  order  in  all  of  the  territories  mentioned. 
To  a considerable  extent  these  conditions  continue  to  the 
present  day.  Japan  asserts  that  her  troops  cannot  safely 
be  withdrawn  from  any  of  these  countries  as  there  is  no 
other  nation  willing  or  able  to  make  the  expenditure 
necessary  to  procure  an  orderly  administration  of  gov- 
ernment in  the  interval  before  normal  conditions  can  be 
restored.  There  is  undoubtedly  a large  measure  of  truth 
in  this  claim.  To  what  extent  the  necessity  for  military 
occupation  is  being  exaggerated  cannot,  of  course,  be 
readily  ascertained.  It  is  doubtful  whether  evidence  is 
obtainable  which  would  be  convincing  to  everybody  upon 


20 


this  point.  For  the  present,  therefore,  we  can  do  nothing 
but  accept  Japan’s  assurances  and  await  developments. 
In  the  meantime,  however,  it  may  be  that  we  shall  hear 
of  recurring  episodes  in  the  military  administration  of 
the  occupied  territory  giving  evidence  not  only  of  rigor 
but  also  pointing  to  an  apparent  intention  to  make  the 
occupation  permanent.  Furthermore,  there  will  un- 
doubtedly be  obstacles  in  Japan  itself  in  making  good 
the  present  assurances  of  the  government  that  territorial 
acquisition  is  not  intended.  Under  any  form  of  govern- 
ment there  is  always  a fundamental  difference  of  opinion 
between  civil  and  military  officials  as  to  methods  of  ad- 
ministering civil  affairs  in  occupied  territory  during  a 
period  between  war  and  peace.  We  had  an  experience 
illustrating  this  when  we  were  establishing  a civil  gov- 
ernment in  the  Philippines,  and  differences  of  opinion  as 
to  methods  of  “benevolent  assimilation”  between  the 
military  commanders  and  the  Philippine  Commission  led 
to  considerable  friction.  The  difficulty  in  such  a situa- 
tion is  accentuated  in  Japan  by  the  still  powerful  influ- 
ence of  the  military  party  in  matters  of  state  policy,  and 
also  by  the  difficulty  of  prompt  communication  with  mili- 
tary commanders  at  distant  places.  Instances  will  no 
doubt  be  repeated  of  such  commanders  dealing  harshly 
with  natives  and  others,  and  perhaps  the  influence  of 
the  military  party  at  home  will  exempt  them  from  ade- 
quate discipline  for  their  officiousness. 

But  despite  such  difficulties  as  these,  the  liberal  party 
in  Japan  is  gradually  gaining  ascendency  in  political 
affairs;  and  the  wisest  men  among  the  military  group 
itself  no  longer  believe  that  Japan  can  pursue  a course 
of  territorial  aggrandizement  at  the  risk  of  war  with 
other  powers.  On  this  party  the  great  war  has  had  a 
sobering  effect  not  only  in  showing  what  may  happen 
to  a militaristic  nation  which  ignores  the  public  opinion 
of  the  world,  but  also  in  its  demonstration  of  the  mili- 
tary power  of  the  United  States  when  fully  aroused.  In 
this  connection  it  is  pertinent  to  say  that  I did  not  dis- 


21 


cover  any  substantial  basis  for  an  apprehension  of  war 
between  our  two  countries.  The  statements  periodically 
occurring  in  our  sensational  press  upon  this  subject  ap- 
pear to  me  to  be  utterly  without  foundation.  Our  re- 
ception by  masses  of  people  in  the  large  cities  and  the 
expressions  of  the  most  influential  journals,  which  de- 
voted much  space  to  the  movements  of  our  party  and 
made  copious  comments  upon  speeches  made  by  its  mem-  _ 
bers,  showed  that  the  Japanese  people  are  much  more 
interested  in  American  affairs  that  we  are  in  Japanese 
affairs;  and  every  indication  was  that  they  are  essen- 
tially friendly. 

The  Improbability  of  War. 

Unfortunately,  there  is  an  appreciable  number  of 
Americans  both  in  this  country  and  in  Japan  who  believe 
that  war  between  the  two  countries  is  inevitable,  and 
they  point  to  certain  preparations  in  Japan  as  indicating 
an  aggressive  policy  on  her  part.  But  such  investiga- 
tion of  these  matters  as  I was  able  to  make  led  me  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  preparations  referred  to  were 
defensive  in  character  and  were  no  more  elaborate  than 
the  exposed  position  of  Japan  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  made 
reasonably  necessary.  There  is  no  party  in  Japan  which, 
from  the  standpoint  either  of  inclination  or  of  national 
policy,  seriously  contemplates  war  with  America.  All 
organized  political  parties  seem  to  agree  that  the  cultiva- 
tion of  cordial  relations  with  this  country  is  the  best 
public  policy  for  Japan.  In  this  connection  the  words  of 
Mr.  Roosevelt,  uttered  in  July,  1918,  come  back  to  me. 
He  said : 

“Japan  is  playing  a great  part  in  the  civilized 
world;  a good  understanding  between  her  and  the 
United  States  is  essential  to  the  international  pro- 
gress, and  it  is  a grave  offense  against  the  United 
States  for  any  man  by  word  or  deed  to  jeopardize 
this  good  understanding.” 


22 


Japan  is  becoming  more  and  more  a democratic  na- 
tion. The  manhood  franchise  has  been  greatly  extended. 
The  interest  of  the  people  in  public  affairs  is  obvious 
to  even  a casual  observer.  On  May  11th  last  I was  a 
witness  to  a manifestation  of  such  interest  in  Kobe.  In 
perhaps  a dozen  places  in  that  city  I saw  crowds  ob- 
structing the  streets  where  bulletin  boards  were  displayed 
showing  the  returns  of  the  election  the  day  before  to  the 
Diet — the  lower  house  of  the  National  legislature.  Such 
political  consciousness  as  this  indicates  is  reflected  in 
the  Japanese  press  whose  wide  circulation  shows  a de- 
mand for  detailed  news  items  and  such  free  comment 
upon  public  affairs  as  fill  their  columns.  It  is  not  im- 
probable that  the  mass  of  the  people  are  taking  a growing 
interest  in  politics  as  they  are  in  industrial  affairs;  and 
as  95  per  cent,  of  them  are  literate  it  is  not  probable  that 
this  interest  will  abate.  Now,  the  common  people  of 
Japan  do  not  want  war.  They  are  intensely  occupied 
with  their  internal  affairs;  and  I am  satisfied  that  this 
attitude  will  go  far  to  neutralize  the  belligerent  feeling 
that  may  exist  among  those  who  still  adhere  to  the  mili- 
taristic policy,  and  particularly  the  young  and  enthusias- 
tic army  and  navy  officers  looking  for  a career. 

It  is  unfortunately  the  fact  that  under  the  Japanese 
form  of  government  the  ministers  of  war  and  of  the 
navy  are  not  removable  as  a result  of  changes  of  political 
administration,  and  they  are  thus  to  some  extent  beyond 
the  reach  of  public  opinion.  Still,  this  fact  will  not  prob- 
ably long  prevent  the  evolution  of  a liberal  policy  under 
which  the  militaristic  influences  in  governmental  admin- 
istration will  be  gradually  diminished.  This  will  also 
naturally  curb  imperialistic  ambition  for  the  acquisition 
of  territory,  particularly  on  the  Asiatic  continent. 

Necessity  for  Territorial  Expansion. 

But  all  this  is  not  to  say  that  Japan  will  not  some 
time  extend  her  territorial  possessions,  if  that  becomes 


23 


necessary  to  satisfy  her  national  needs,  particularly  in 
feeding  and  clothing  her  people  and  in  obtaining  raw 
materials  which  are  required  in  her  essential  industries. 
If  China,  America  and  the  western  powers  who  have  an 
interest  in  Oriental  affairs,  refuse  to  recognize  these 
needs,  Japan  will,  despite  all  objection,  be  driven  to  sup- 
plying them.  Her  population  is  growing  at  the  rate  of 
600,000  a year  and  the  most  ordinary  considerations  of 
prudence  require  that  she  should  protect  her  people 
against  the  evils  of  overcrowding  her  already  densely 
populated  islands.  That  she  wishes  to  accomplish  that 
result  by  dismembering  China  is  by  no  means  clear,  but 
that  she  seeks  to  obtain  an  economic  foothold  in  Man- 
churia, Mongolia,  Shantung  and  perhaps  Siberia,  as  a 
means  of  procuring  raw  materials,  and  that  she  will  en- 
courage her  people  to  emigrate  to  those  countries,  is  not 
only  probable  but  seemingly  justifiable.  If  this  aspect  of 
the  situation  is  dealt  with  sympathetically  from  the 
viewpoint  of  Japan’s  national  necessities,  a settlement  of 
pending  Asiatic  questions  will  become  more  simple,  par- 
ticularly as  never  before  has  Japan  been  so  sensitive  to 
adverse  criticism  of  her  imperialistic  tendencies  as  she 
is  now.  The  friendly  intervention  of  America  in  these 
matters  would  not  be  resented;  and  we  occupy  a position 
which  would  enable  us  to  be  of  substantial  service  to 
civilization  in  eliminating  possible  causes  of  international 
trouble  in  the  Orient. 

June  26th,  1920. 

HENRY  W.  TAFT. 


24 


The  Origin  of  the  Japan  Society 


Thirteen  years  ago  some  700  Americans,  including 
many  of  New  York’s  most  prominent  citizens,  honored 
the  arrival  in  this  country  of  two  Japanese  warships  at  a 
banquet  at  which  Ambassador  Viscount  S.  Aoki,  General 
Baron  T.  Kuroki  and  Admiral  G.  Ijuin  were  the  guests  of 
the  evening. 

As  a result  of  this  spontaneous  expression  of 
America’s  feeling  of  cordiality  and  good  will  toward  its 
Western  neighbor,  the  Japan  Society  had  its  origin.  The 
old  saying  “Time  will  Tell”  again  proved  true,  for  around 
the  small  group  of  men  who  organized  the  Society  in 
May,  1907,  there  has  grown  a membership  of  some  1,500, 
about  1,200  of  whom  are  Americans. 

Through  the  broad  distribution  of  its  Trade  and  News 
Bulletins,  informative  books,  pamphlets  and  question- 
naires throughout  the  United  States;  through  the  circu- 
lating library,  the  Information  Bureau,  the  Travel  De- 
partment and  by  means  of  illustrated  lectures,  the  Society 
is  accomplishing  a work  of  international  importance. 

And  so,  out  of  the  visit  of  the  two  Japanese  warships 
there  was  conceived  an  American  organization  whose 
peaceful  mission  it  should  be  to  bring  more  closely  to- 
gether the  peoples  of  two  great  nations,  one  in  the  East, 
the  other  in  the  West. 


26 


Japan  Society 

Officers 

FRANK  A.  VANDERLIP 
President 

LINDSAY  RUSSELL 
Chairman,  Board  of  Directors 

AUGUST  BELMONT 
Vice-President 

DOUGLAS  L.  DUNBAR 
Assistant  to  President 

EUGENE  C.  WORDEN 
Secretary 

BANKERS  TRUST  COMPANY 
Treasurer 


Directors 


R,  Arai 

George  J.  Baldwin 
U.  N.  Bethell 
A.  W.  Burchard 
Theodore  E.  Burton 
Henry  Clews 
William  North  Duane 
Elbert  H.  Gary 
Hamilton  Holt 
A.  Barton  Hepburn 
Herbert  S.  Houston 
R.  Ichinomiya 
Darwin  P.  Kingsley 


M.  Kobayashi 
Thomas  W.  Lamont 
Howard  Mansfield 
Emerson  McMillin 
James  R.  Morse 
Jacob  H.  Schiff 
Don  C.  Seitz 
Melville  E.  Stone 
Gerard  Swope 
Alexander  Tison 
Guy  E.  Tripp 
Dr.  Jokichi  Takamine 
William  H.  Williams 


OFFICE 

25  West  43rd  Street 
NEW  YORK 


27 


( 


' 


